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DEREGULATION AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT
ON AIRLINE OPERATIONS
DONALD J. LLOYD-JONES*
D URING THE PAST year the subject of deregulation has
emerged as one of the principal issues being debated within
the United States. While the issue has been raised with regard to
virtually every industry now regulated by the federal govern-
ment, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the meaning of de-
regulation relative to the airline industry and its potential effects
on that industry's long-run future.
The deregulators are calling for a reduction or elimination of
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) control of the two most critical
factors affecting an airlines' operation-which routes it may fly and
what fares it may charge. While critics of regulation and other
regulated industries have always existed, never in the thirty-seven
year history of the Federal Aviation Act has such a strong and co-
ordinated attack been mounted upon the basic principles under-
lying airline regulation. Economists concerned with excess gov-
ernment regulation, consumerists concerned with high prices, and
various political factions have combined together into one cohe-
sive force.
A brief look at the development of the air transport industry
over the past fifty years will provide background to the ensuing
discussion.
I. HISTORY
The industry as it exists today is very different in its structure
from the situation in 1938, before the CAB was established. Prior
to 1938 the industry was in a state of chaos, most carriers were
experiencing serious financial problems or were on the brink of
* Senior Vice President, Operations, American Airlines, Inc.
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bankruptcy, the industry safety record was poor, unfair competi-
tion was the order of the day, and the public had no protection
from deceptive practices. The CAB was established in 1938 to
bring order to the industry, to prevent the wave of bankruptcies
that threatened to reduce the industry to a few surviving carriers,
and to protect the public from abusive pricing practices.
The proponents of deregulation argue that the CAB's record
is blemished by its alleged failure to certificate new carriers into
the industry. Such criticism is without merit. To begin with, it
makes little difference whether additional competition comes in
the form of a new carrier or the expansion of existing airlines. A
vast amount of new competitive route authority has been granted
by the Board to existing carriers since 1938. In 1938, when the
CAB was created, there were 37,864 route miles authorized and
today that figure has increased twelve-fold to 459,514 route miles.
Furthermore, the CAB has been extremely active and willing to
experiment with the certification of new carriers. In the last thirty-
seven years the CAB has authorized approximately eighty-five new
carriers to enter the air transportation field. This number includes
some fifty so-called large irregular carriers that were granted ex-
emption authority following World War II when many pilots and
surplus aircraft became available. They were the forefathers of the
current supplementals of whom only nine or ten have survived,
reflecting a high mortality rate that resulted from inadequate fi-
nancing and a generally poor safety record.
. The number also includes twenty-nine local service and helicop-
ter carriers and six all-cargo carriers-three other new classes of
carriers that did not exist in 1938. Moreover, each of the eight sur-
viving local service carriers is now larger than American Airlines
was in 1938 when it was the world's largest trunkline carrier.
The foregoing clearly illustrates that the CAB not only helped
stabilize the air transport industry, but also encouraged the devel-
opment and diversification of types of service by authorizing new
classes of carriers as progressive circumstances dictated. To de-
regulate the airline industry to the degree some are suggesting
would undo all of these efforts, and return the industry to its chao-
tic state prior to 1938.
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II. PROPOSED DEREGULATION
The proposed changes to existing airline regulation as spelled
out in the Aviation Act of 1975 fall into two general categories:
First, the Act would allow freedom of entry and exit by substan-
tially modifying the CAB certification power. This modification, it
is alleged, would allow more efficient, lower cost carriers to enter
markets and drive out the inefficient, high cost carriers. The result
would be lower prices.
Secondly, the Act would eliminate the CAB's power to control
rates, or allow carriers to file rates over a broad "range of reason-
ableness" in order to allow more efficient carriers to operate at a
lower rate, or to provide a more spartan service at a lower cost.
This change would also allow rate competition, which allegedly
does not exist under current CAB policies.
When such radical changes are proposed in the basic structure
of an industry, one generally looks for a major area in which that
industry has failed to serve the public interest. Generally, the
answer may be found in one or more of the following areas: safe-
ty, volume of service, quality of service, technological progress,
operating costs, or pricing. An examination of the air transport
industry performance in each of these areas follows.
A. Safety
In the area of safety, the performance of our country's air
transportation system is a matter of public record. Over the past
decade U.S. air transportation has been more than twice as safe
as air transportation elsewhere in the free world. Advocates of the
Aviation Act of 1975 state that safety will not be adversely affect-
ed by the Act because the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) will be beefed-up sufficiently to assure that comers will not
be cut. Safety, however, is a full time proposition. Daily judg-
ments must be made as to what is safe and what is not, and un-
fortunately these judgments are seldom black and white. As head of
Operations for the carrier which has just received recognition by
the Flight Safety Foundation for unparalleled achievements in the
field of safety, I can state without qualification that an under-fi-
nanced shoe-string operation will never be as safe as an establish-
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ed, well-financed corporation with commitments to public service
over the long term.
History itself underscores and emphasizes this safety message.
The original Civil Aviation Act of 1938 was itself conceived and
enacted for the simple reason that airlines were not sufficiently safe
and because a degree of pricing chaos existed in which members
of the public were paying grossly different fares for the same
transportation service. Again, in the period immediately after
World War II when returning veterans were permitted to estab-
lish small unscheduled airlines with minimum capitalization, the
safety record of the industry slumped radically and regulation had
to be tightened. Each time that freedom of entry and open price
competition became realities, safety and service radically deterior-
ated. Subsequently, the choice was made (each time) to tighten
regulation, but in the interim there had been a tragic waste of
money and human life.
Safety rates oompared (3 year averages)
'Fatalities per 100 million passenger miles
Source: Air Transport Association
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The record of the air transport industry in its fifty-year history has
been outstanding. Its fatality rate has been consistently dropping
until now airline travel is safer than rail transportation and about
as safe as bus transportation.
It is clear from the airlines' enormous investment in redun-
dant equipment and new technology that safety is given top prior-
ity. The training, maintenance, and operations standards employed
by U.S. airlines are the highest of any form of transportation,
public or private. Similarly, the design and manufacture, testing,
and government certification of U.S. aircraft serve as a model the
world over. It would be deplorable if the safety standards of air
transportation were again to suffer from an ill-considered move
toward deregulation.
B. Volume of Service
A second service consideration for which an industry can be
criticized is the degree to which it fails to meet the service needs
of its customers. As mentioned earlier, there are currently 459,514
certified route miles in the United States. In the year 1974, de-
spite frequency reductions required for fuel shortages, the U.S.
airline industry operated some two and a quarter billion revenue
plane miles. By this measure, therefore, each unduplicated route
mile was flown on the average of 13.5 times per day. Nowhere else
in the world does density of service begin to approach this level,
a fact which has no doubt contributed to the rapid development
of passenger air travel within the United States. Within the U.S.
today scheduled air service is provided between 50,000 city pairs
and U.S. trunk carriers serve 994 nonstop routes.
Despite the clear adequacy of this service record, deregulators
argue that more direct competition or the threat of more competi-
tion is necessary to exert sufficient pressures on carriers to be as
efficient as possible and to provide as much service as desirable.
For example, one provision of the Aviation Act of 1975 would
provide any carrier the right to inaugurate nonstop service between
any two points it currently serves. Another would allow supple-
mentals to operate scheduled service. Still another would give in-
temational carriers domestic authority. And finally, as if this were
not enough, each carrier would be given a certain amount of dis-
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cretionary or bonus new route authority each year which could
be used to commence service wherever it pleased. These provisions
clearly create the equivalent of a free-entry condition for the airline
industry. Just one of the aforementioned provisions would increase
the average number of carriers permitted to fly in each of the top
one hundred markets from the current average of 2.6 to a new
level of 6.0.
FREEDOM OF ENTRY ANALYSIS*
100 TOP CAB O&D MARKETS












































* Assumes a carrier may operate
tificate.
nonstop between any two points on its cer-
Source: American Airlines, Inc.
Under this same provision sixty percent of the top one hundred
most densely traveled markets could be served by six or more car-
riers and a quarter of the markets would have eight or more car-
riers certificated to serve them-and that is only under one of the
proposed provisions cited above.
What is not realized is that deregulation could ultimately de-
stroy airline service to a substantial percentage of smaller U.S.
cities. In an unregulated industry no airline will serve the smaller
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FREEDOM OF ENTRY ANALYSIS*
100 TOP CAB O&D MARKETS
TRUNKS & PAN AMERICAN
Nonstop MARKETS CUMULATIVE PERCENT
Carriers Existing Free Existing Free
Authorized Authority Entry Authority Entry
11 0 0 0% 0%
10 0 1 0 1
9 0 5 0 6
8 1 17 1 23
7 0 21 1 44
6 2 16 3 60
5 2 17 5 77
4 5 12 10 89
3 38 8 48 97
2 47 3 95 100
1 5 0 100 100
* Assumes a carrier may operate nonstop between any two points on its certifi-
cate.
Source: American Airlines, Inc.
lines connect 50,000 city pairs today, seventy percent of the busi-
ness comes from only 900 of those pairs.
What would happen if full deregulation came to pass? It is im-
possible to say precisely, but in a study done by the Air Transport
Association (ATA), the results were startling.
The ATA report said in summary that under deregulation
scheduled air service might be eliminated or substantially reduced
on 1,820 nonstop routes.
U.S. trunk carriers serve 994 nonstop routes. Of these, the re-
port said 372 could be candidates for elimination with many of the
remaining 622 experiencing service curtailment.
The ATA findings also show that where significant fare reduc-
tions might be made, the number of unprofitable routes rises from
372 to 564.
If subsidy by the federal government were increased in order to
maintain service at small cities, the ATA forecasts that the cost
of such subsidies, which today amount to $70 million and are paid
to regional carriers only, could rise to as much as $1 billion an-
nually. Service to the small cities today is provided through a care-
fully constructed fare structure which provides earnings on long-
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haul routes sufficient to make it economically practical for airlines
to serve shorter, less densely traveled routes in order to develop
connecting long-haul traffic. Under the proposals of the Aviation
Act of 1975 these more profitable long-haul routes will inevitably
be the first target of added competition, thereby destroying the eco-
nomic framework of air transportation network as it is known to-
day.
The cities served by air carriers are certainly not in favor of the
freedom of entry provision of the Aviation Act of 1975. A recent
statement of policy issued by the Airport Operators Council Inter-
national (AOCI) representing airport managers throughout the
U.S., addresses this subject directly:
AOCI opposes the removal of route certification by CAB
which would result in erratic air service to the nation's communi-
ties and undermine the stability of airport/airline financial ar-
rangements which enable airport operators to plan and finance
needed facilities.
Pending a determination of the form and extent deregulation
might take, it is practically impossible to predict with any certain-
ty the specific impact such a program would have on airport fi-
nancing. Regulation by CAB does, however, provide the economic
stability which permits the orderly long-range planning and financ-
ing of needed facilities because the present certification process
both grants the air carrier an operating right and imposes an ob-
ligation on the carrier to provide service responsive to that right.
Freedom of entry and exit allows full operating rights (at the will
of the carrier), but imposes no service obligation.
The existing air transportation system in the United States is an
integrated system comprised of numerous parts, i.e., airframe and
power plant suppliers, support services suppliers, airline operators,
airport operators, federal services (Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, National Transportation Safety Board and Civil Aeronaut-
ics Board), and others. Problems adversely affecting one part of an
integrated system also affect the other parts and solutions to those
problems also affect all parts of the system. The operators of
the nation's airport system, represented by the United States
members of the Airport Operators Council International, are
greatly concerned about the successful resolution of the economic
problems confronting the airline industry. Airports are an inte-
gral part of the air transport industry and consequently their fi-
nancial viability is dependent on the economic well being of the
entire industry. The airport operator's enormous investment in
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costly facilities, his ability to raise investment monies for needed
facility improvement and expansion and his responsibility to pro-
vide the public a diversity of services are, essentially, supported
by leases and other financial commitments with major airline ten-
ants. In addition, the revenue generated from other tenants at
airports is dependent upon the passengers and freight generated at
an airport by airline operations.
Deregulation proposals that would remove CAB route certifica-
tion would have the effect of removing service stability from the na-
tion's communities. Route certificates, which require a designated
minimum service level by specified carriers, ensure that the "pub-
lic confidence and necessity" is served and that entry and exit of
carriers to and from markets does not occur without a determina-
tion of need and whether replacement service to fulfill the service
and economic commitments of the departing carriers is required in
the public interest. In the economic and financial management of
airports, certificated service provides the stability necessary to fi-
nance airport development and to provide both the carriers and
the traveling public with adequate, efficient and safe facilities at a
reasonable cost.
In addition to the removal of carrier entry and exit provisions,
some proponents of deregulation also propose some degree of
fare flexibility. Although the theoretical supposition underlying the
approach is that such fare competition would result in lower fares
and traffic stimulation, it can also be expected that some carriers
would either not be economically able to match lower fares offer-
ed by competitors and be forced from markets, or would attempt
to match the lower fares with a resulting deterioration of service,
safety and economic viability. Under such conditions, carrier
bankruptcies would pose serious economic problems for all sec-
tors of the aviation industry, including airport operators.
The promotion of a more efficient, safe and economical air
transportation system in the United States can be achieved without
the deregulation of the regulatory structure that has been instru-
mental in molding the present system and providing the stability
required for the planning and financing of airport facilities serving
that system. AOCI opposes the removal of route certification by
CAB which would result in erratic air service to the nation's
communities and undermine the stability of airport/airline finan-
cial arrangements which enable airport operators to plan and fi-
nance needed facilities.
In a deregulated environment the air transport industry will be
unwilling to accept the enormous financial responsibilities neces-
sary to maintain airports and airport facilities throughout the U.S.
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No longer will American or any other carrier be willing to invest
enormous sums in airport improvements, ticket counters, passenger
facilities and the like when the state of the industry is so uncertain
under the conditions of deregulation.
At the present time American Airlines alone is looking at new
master plans, drawn up by city governments, totalling $4.04 bil-
lion at the various airports into which it operates. Not all of those
plans will be realized, but the size of the proposals emphasizes the
high amounts of capital that must be raised to finance local air-
ports.
C. Quality of Service
There is no doubt that with deregulation the quality of airline
service would be reduced. But the savings which would result
from the elimination of so called service "frills" has been greatly
exaggerated. It is quite common among the deregulators to charge
that the airlines themselves could drastically reduce fares if the
amenities of flight service were dropped: no movies to Minneap-
olis, no cocktails to California, and no food to Ft. Worth. If Amer-
ican Airlines had offered no food service in 1974, no beverage
service, no in-flight entertainment, and had done absolutely no ad-
vertising, it could have saved a total of only five dollars per pas-
senger. No one has asserted that for a five dollar reduction in the
price of a ticket a mass of new travelers would appear at ticket
counters desiring air transportation.
James E. Landry, general counsel of the Air Transport Asso-
ciation, told a University of Akron Law School symposium:
Measured by any consumer standard-by a standard of price, or
of quality, or of safety, or of service coverage, and by the freedom
of choice from among a large number of competing airlines-this
country's scheduled airline system works extraordinarily well.
Carrying out provisions of the proposed Aviation Act of 1975,
would ultimately decrease the number of airlines now offering
competitive service, would reduce the amount and quality of
scheduled air service and, over the long run, would produce high-
er fares and the most repressive regulation air transportation that
its customers have ever known.
Noting that the nation has become accustomed to good sched-
uled airline service, a high standard of quality and that people
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would not put up with the lack of it for very long, Landry said
that "more stringent regulation and heavy subsidy would be costs
occurring down the road a piece in a desperate effort to bring back
a decimated air transport system to levels enjoyed by the public
today."
D. Technological Progress
Another area that would be stymied by deregulation of the in-
dustry is the important technological advances that have been
made in the last fifty years by the air transport industry. Deregula-
tion of the industry would have an effect on the airframe and en-
gine manufacturers as well as upon the hundreds of other aviation-
related industries such as avionics firms, research and develop-
ment organizations, computer manufacturers, and others who
would no longer be in a position to produce equipment for the in-
dustry.
The U.S. airline industry has long been respected for its tech-
nological progress. Since its inception some fifty years ago the air-
line industry has sponsored and financed a major new aircraft tech-
nological development on the average of once every eight years.
Environmental considerations alone are a perfect example of what
has been accomplished: smokeless engines, reduced fuel consump-
tion, and less noise. The avionics of the new large jets, a spin-off
from the space program, now allow these jets weighing up to 700,-
000 pounds to land in zero-zero weather. Inertial navigation sys-
tems, costing over $100,000 each, now guide airplanes without
requiring any radio inputs from the ground.
One must be concerned about the future of the U.S. commer-
cial aerospace industry under a proposed system in which no air-
line can feel secure in committting support for technological prog-
ress to improve the environmental, economic, and fuel efficiency
characteristics of aircraft.
Not only is this statement true for airborne systems, but for
ground support systems as well. The airlines have been in the fore-
front in sponsoring advanced design computers. They have done
much to aid computer organizations in developing their products
to a more sophisticated level. The development of American's pas-
senger reservations system, called SABRE, was one of IBM's most
challenging undertakings. American alone now has nine advanced
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computers that are used for purposes ranging from payroll to the
tracking of aircraft in flight. Outside of the U.S. government, the
airlines have been the largest users of computers in the country.
E. Operating Costs
One of the most serious charges leveled against the airline in-
dustry is that of overcharging the public for its service. Nonethe-
less, examination of the efficiency of U.S. carriers and that of car-
riers elsewhere in the world fails to substantiate the charge that
U.S. carriers are inefficient. The following table compares the rev-
enue ton miles produced per employee for U.S. trunkline carriers
with that of major foreign carriers. It should be borne in mind in
examining this comparison that the foreign carriers shown have
substantially greater stage lengths than most U.S. carriers, provid-
ing them with a significant opportunity for greater productivity.














































Source: Air Transport World, January 1976, page 27.
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On the basis of the foregoing comparison and other available com-
parative data it is evident that American carriers are on average
more efficient than carriers located elsewhere in the world.
Another basis for the claim of operating inefficiency has been
found in a comparison between the operating costs of U.S. inter-
state airlines and the costs of Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA),
an intrastate carrier operating solely within the state of California.
Over the years PSA's operating costs have been substantially be-
low comparable costs for interstate carriers. Until recently PSA
successfully operated without union representation of its employees
thus giving it some advantages on rates of pay and a substantial
advantage in its ability to cross-utilize employees. More recently,
a substantial percentage of PSA's employees have become orga-
nized and PSA was in severe financial difficulty through much of
1975. PSA as an intrastate carrier is not subject to regulation by
the CAB, but is regulated in a highly similar manner by the Cal-
ifornia Public Utilities Commission with regard to the rates it may
charge and the routes it may fly.
The allegation of overcharging, which uses PSA's operations as
its basis, focuses on PSA's operating costs in the Los Angeles to
San Francisco corridor. Comparing PSA's mileage rates in this
market with rates charged by interstate carriers on similar stage
lengths, some proponents of deregulation, like Senator Kennedy,
have come to the conclusion that interstate carriers could lower
rates by twenty-five to thirty-three percent if they were as "effi-
cient" as PSA. What has been overlooked in this comparison is that
the Los Angeles to San Francisco market is the most densely trav-
eled segment in the United States and benefits from highly favor-
able weather conditions which permit a high percentage of flights
to be conducted under visual flight rules. Further, the deregulators
have overlooked the fact that PSA does not attempt to provide a
complete airline service nor is it a member of the integrated inter-
state airline system of this country.
A recent study by Dr. John R. Summerfield, a consultant, who
testified before the subcommittee on Administrative Practices and
Procedures, shows that if PSA offered the same reservations, tic-
keting, inter-airline baggage connections, and food service between
all U.S. cities as the interstate carriers, its annual costs would
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have been $20 million greater in 1974, an increase of seventeen
percent in operating costs.
Dr. Summerfield points out the inconsistencies in comparing an
intrastate carrier with the major trunklines. For example, he testi-
fied that "PSA has estimated its reservations service cost at seventy-
seven cents per passenger. If it had to handle the typical reserva-
tion loads of an intrastate carrier (three minutes vs. one minute per
call), its costs would probably be at least $1.50 per passenger
higher, or an extra $9.75 million a year."
In addition, he points out the training and revenue accounting
costs that trunklines are burdened with, but PSA is not. "Because
it doesn't sell interline space," says Dr. Summerfield, "PSA saves
about $11 million a year compared with its interstate counter-
parts."
There are cost savings in other areas as well. For instance, since
PSA operates on short hauls solely within the state of California,
their flight times are short and they need offer no food or enter-
tainment. Space normally required for galley equipment can there-
fore be used for seats, thereby creating an opportunity to generate
more revenue per flight with little or no increase in operating costs.
Dr. Summerfield summed up his study very succinctly by saying:
[T]he low-cost operation of the California intrastate air carriers
is a thing of the past except for that portion of the cost structure
attributable to isolation from the integrated U.S. air transportation
system.
On the other hand, if all airlines were PSA's, the U.S. would
not have a viable network of air transportation.
F. Pricing
Probably the most important objective in the eyes of the dereg-
ulators is to bring "real" price competition to the airline industry.
It is hard to understand the argument that there is little price
competition in the air transport industry today. In fact, one of the
most frequent criticisms leveled at the industry is that too many
discount fares are available. Examination of the following page,
excerpted from American's timetable effective January 5, 1976,
gives the reader a vivid picture of the variety of available discount
fares, ranging from a multitude of excursion fares with discounts
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SPECIAL FARE INFORMATION
Fare Explanation Fare listed is
Code O.W. R.T.
F First Class X
FN Deluxe Night Coach X
J *No-Frill. Ticket purchase and reservations required at least 7 days in
advance. Travel permitted Monday through Thursday. No travel
permitted after June 17, 1976. X
K Economy X
KN *Night Economy X




YEB *Excursion. Travel permitted on Saturday, Monday or Tuesday. Minimum/ X
YEBM maximum return limit 1/16 days. YE8M fares not valid on non-stop flights. X
YE10 Excursion. No minimum/10 days maximum return limit. X
YE26 Excursion. Minimum return limit to/from San Francisco Sunday after
YLE26 departure; to/from all other points 7 days. Maximum return limit 30 days X
YE30 *Inclusive Tour Fare. Required ground tour purchase. Travel not permitted
YNE30 after 2 p.m. on Friday and Sunday. Minimum return limit varies
depending on destination. Maximum return limit 30 days. X
YE32 *Excursion. Travel not permitted between 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. on Fridays
and Sundays. Minimum/maximum return limit 10/30 days. X
YE33 Ski Tour Excursion. Ground tour purchase required. Travel permitted
Monday through Friday mornings; all day Saturday and Sunday. Return
limits 2/30 days. Fares do not apply for travel originating at
Albany or Hartford. X
YE38 *Excursion. Travel permitted on Saturday or Tuesday. Minimum/maximum
YE38M return limits 24 hours/30 days. YE38M fares not valid on non-stop flights. X
YLE27 *Excursion. Reservations and ticket purchase required 7 days in advance.
YNLE27 Minimum/maximum return limit 7/30 days. YCHE27 fares apply for
YCHE27 accompanied children 2 through 11 years of age. YNLE27 fare applies
on night coach service only. Fares will not apply for travel originating
after January 31, 1976. X
YLE40 *Excursion. Reservations and ticket purchase required 14 days in advance.
YNLE40 Minimum/maximum return limit 7/30 days. YNLE40 fares apply on night
YCHE40 coach service only. YCHE40 fares apply for accompanied children
2 through 11 years of age. Fares apply for travel originating on and
after February 1, 1976. X
YN Night Coach X
YU Adult Standby. Reservations not permitted. Not valid on non-stop flights. X
YWE1 *Weekend Travel Fare. Travel permitted on Saturday and Sunday. X
YWE2 *Weekend Excursion. Outbound travel permitted on Saturday or Sunday;
YWE2M return travel permitted on Saturday, Sunday or through noon Monday.
YME2M fares not valid on non-stop flights. No minimum/30 day
maximum return limit. X
YWE3 *Weekend Excursion. Outbound travel permitted on Saturday or Sunday;
YWE3M return travel permitted on Saturday, Sunday or through noon Monday.
No minimum/30 day maximum return limit. YWE3M Fares not valid
on non-stop flights. X
YWE29 Weekend Ski Excursion. Travel permitted between 6 p.m. Friday and
Midnight Sunday. No minimum/2 day maximum return limit. Fares
do not apply for travel originating at Albany or Hartford. X
YWE44 *Weekend Excursion. Travel permitted between 8:00 pm Friday and Midnight
YWCHE44 Sunday. No minimum/2-day maximum stay. YWCHE44 fares apply for
accompanied children 2 through 11 years of age. X
YXE9 *Midweek Excursion Travel permitted Monday through Tuesday. Ticket
purchase required 7 days in advance. Minimum/maximum return
limit 7/9 days. X
O.W.- One Way Fare R.T.- Round Trip Fare
*Consult AA for further details including restricted travel periods, blackout periods, cancellation
penalty.
Fares listed in this timetable are for information only and are subject to change without notice.
Due to routing circuity, fares for specific itineraries may be higher than those listed.
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of thirty percent, a number of inclusive tour fares with still great-
er discounts, night coach service with thirty-five percent discounts,
special weekend and ski tour excursions, and finally, children fares
at fifty percent discounts.
Not all of these fares are offered by every carier on every seg-
ment, but when one carrier offers a particular discount fare it is
extremely rare to find a case in which competing carriers do not
match it. What the deregulators really mean then is not that there
is an absence of price competition, but that there is no price dif-
ferentiation. Each carrier offers the same or similar service at iden-
tical fares. But the absence of price differentiation does not result
from a lack of competition. Rather, it reflects the nature of the
airline product and the dynamics of the market place. Basically
airlines sell a non-differentiated product-a seat between point A
and point B. Surveys show and share of market statistics prove,
that airline customers will select that carrier which offers the low-
est fare for which they qualify. There is no way that any airline
can remain competitive if it does not meet a lower price offered
by a competitor.
Airline earnings also fail to substantiate the claims of overcharg-
ing leveled by many deregulation advocates. It has already been
shown that U.S. airline efficiency exceeds that of carriers else-
where in the free world. If unit cost comparisons are favorable,
any overcharging of airline customers should be reflected in ex-
cessive profits. Quite the contrary is true. In 1974 the domestic
trunklines had the best dollar earnings in their history. Nonethe-
less, the total earnings of $324 million represented only a 3.3%
margin on sales and a 3.2% return on total invested capital (ex-
cluding all lease commitments). Preliminary 1975 results indicate
that the domestic trunklines experienced a loss in excess of $100
million.
Despite the poor earnings of the industry over many years, many
advocates of deregulation claim that a sweetheart relationship exists
between the CAB and the airline industry. The answer to such
claims lies in the earnings record itself and in the inability of the
industry to obtain timely fare increases. As recently as June 1975,
when it was apparent that the industry was on its way towards a
substantial loss year, the CAB turned down requests for fare in-
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creases. To justify the denial, however, the CAB had to alter its
rate making principles, established in public hearings held during
the early 1970's, by disallowing from the investment base air-
craft which had become technologically obsolete due to high fuel
prices, revising the income base to increase objective utilization
factosr and disallowing a substantial proportion of discount fare
travel. These CAB actions are now the subject of a lawsuit insti-
tuted by a number of airlines.
Because of the emphasis by advocates of deregulation on air-
line fares, the industry's historical fare performance takes on spe-
cial significance. During the last thirty years the cost of shoes has
risen 120%; of a car 228%; of tuition at Harvard 647%, while
the average airline yield has risen only 16.6% in a period of thir-
teen years and most of that has come recently in the wake of spir-
aling fuel costs.
The airline industry believes its record on pricing, quality and
safety of service, and technological innovation is an outstanding
one. For example, in constant dollars average air fares today are
sixty-three percent less than in 1938. Even when expressed in cur-
rent dollars, the record is impressive. The one-way fare from New
York to San Diego in 1935 was $160. Today's full fare one-way
ticket on that route is $182, but the night coach price (available
seven days a week without restrictions) is only $146-$14 less
than the 1935 price. Between Chicago and San Diego, travelers
in 1935 paid $115 one-way, but today's night coach passengers
make the trip for just $11 0-in planes that are infinitely faster and
more comfortable than the aircraft of the mid-1930's.
In addition, every recent survey shows airline travel to be
among the cheapest forms of travel and certainly the fastest. In
the July 1975, issue of U.S. News and World Report, travel costs
for two adults on three typical journeys were compared. The study
showed, for example, that for two adults traveling betwen Chicago
and San Francisco leaving on a Monday and returning within thir-
ty days, the couple could make the air trip in 4V2 hours at a cost
of $443. The same trip by rail involved fifty hours and, including
the necessary meals and bedroom expenses, cost $743. By bus
the comparable numbers were fifty-three hours and $469, and by
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car (considering lodging, meals and tolls along with mileage) they
were 42 days travel time and $685 cost.
In addition to criticizing recent increases in airline fares, critics
of the air transport industry frequently draw unfavorable com-
parisons between the U.S. industry and that of Europe. The cost
of air transportation in Europe fails to bear out this contention.
Even with the various pooling and restrictive service agreements be-
tween European carriers, which would be illegal in this country,
the cost of an intra-Europe ticket averages more than one-third
higher than in the United States. For example, a ticket between
Dallas and Detroit, a distance of 987 miles is $81, between London
and Lisbon, a distance of 966 miles, the cost is $160.
III. OPERATING EFFICIENCY
The U.S. air transport industry is sympathetic with the desire of
its customers to fly at lower prices. It does not agree, however,
with the proposals of the deregulators or with the specific provi-
sions of the Aviation Act of 1975. In fact, a very strong case can
be made that enactment of the Act would be counter-productive
and lead to higher, rather than lower fares. There are in reality
only two methods available to lower fares significantly: one is to
increase productivity per dollar of employee salary and the second
is to increase load factor. Labor costs now account for more than
forty percent of the airline expense dollar and airline employees
are among the highest paid employees of any U.S. industry. De-
regulation could conceivably change this pattern by admitting low
cost, non-union airlines to serve the more densely traveled routes.
Under such circumstances the older, unionized airlines could be
rather quickly forced to abandon all non-profitable routes and
drastically reduce employment. Even then many would be forced
into bankruptcy and be replaced by lower cost non-union com-
panies. As these unorganized carriers became unionized in their
turn, they too could be replaced by non-union airlines. The re-
sult of this scenario could be lower airline prices, but only at a
substantial cost measured in safety, service to smaller communi-
ties, and human suffering. The CAB Special Staff Study of the
Aviation Act of 1975 pointed out that one of the benefits of the
bill would be to reduce the "stranglehold" that organized labor
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has exerted on the airline industry. Based on the preceding sce-
nario it is clearly possible that costs could be reduced, but the
price required to do so is extremely high.
A more palatable means of reducing price is to raise airline load
factors. The incremental cost of carrying an additional passenger
on a scheduled flight has been estimated variously between seven
and thirteen percent. Based on these estimates, higher load factors
could exert great economic leverage. A flight with one hundred
seats at a fifty percent load factor may have to charge one hundred
dollars per ticket to break even. The same flight with a hundred
percent-load factor, however, could charge fifty-five dollars per
ticket and realize the same breakeven operation. Unfortunately,
the demand for air travel is highly seasonal, varying by time of
day, day of week, and month of year. Accordingly, it has proven
impossible for air transportation to operate for an extended period
of time at load factors much in excess of sixty percent and pro-
vide adequate public service during peak demand periods. Nor
does this load factor experience suffer in comparison with other
modes of transportation. While the airline industry has achieved
load factors in the mid fifty percent range, the intercity bus in-
dustry has achieved load factors in the low forty percent range
and the passenger railroads in the thirty percent range. Compar-
ing air transport load factors with the utility industry yields the
same favorable result. The Annual Report of the Con Edison
Company of New York shows that in 1974 it operated at a load
factor of 50.8%. In the same year, and for much the same rea-
sons, the U.S. scheduled airline industry operated at a passenger
load factor of 54.9%
Every airline executive would agree that somewhat higher load
factors could benefit his own airline and be of simultaneous bene-
fit to the traveling public in the form of lower prices. Nonetheless,
the means of achieving higher load factors while meeting public
service requirements in a competitive industry are limited. It has al-
ready been shown that airline operating costs and profit margins
permit little decrease in the existing fare structure. Further, studies
of the elasticity of demand for air transportation generally indicate
that the total demand for air transportation is relatively inelastic.
In its General Passenger Fare Investigation in the early 1970's,
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the CAB found that the elasticity of demand for air transporta-
tion was less than unity, estimating it at a level of -0.7. There
are clearly segments of demand for air transportation which are
elastic, but these are already appealed to through the existing
multitude of specialized airline discount fares. It has been gen-
erally concluded by experienced airline observers that further im-
provements in load factor lie not in lower fares or more discount
fares, but in fewer available seat miles. The latter has been found
difficult to achieve in today's competitive environment. Load fac-
tors would be still further depressed in an industry characterized
by the degree of freedom of entry proposed in the Aviation Act of
1975.
IV. ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEREGULATION
Thus far this paper has dealt with the pragmatic issues under-
lying current pressures from the administration and consumerists
in proposing deregulation of the U.S. air transportation industry.
It has been argued that the deregulation proposal is likely to be
counter-productive in achieving the price decreases sought by
these groups. During the debate over deregulation, however, no
one has yet addressed himself specifically to the position of the
academicians. In summary form their position can be stated as fol-
lows:
1. The airline industry is not a natural monopoly since it has been
determined that some degree of competition is desirable in the
public interest;
2. There exists relative ease of disposal of assets in the airline in-
dustry thus differentiating it from a true utility; and,
3. One airline can very easily and quickly be replaced by another
in providing a particular segment of air transportation.
While each part of the academicians' argument has an element
of truth, all parts focus upon and tend to exaggerate the differ-
ences between airlines and public utilities and ignore the many
similarities that exist. For a full understanding of this point it is
necessary to examine the basic economic characteristics which have
become generally recognized as representatives of a utility. Posses-
sion of these characteristics has been used by the government as
an argument for regulatory control. Over a period of years and
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through a long series of court cases the judicial system has devel-
oped a generally accepted set of criteria to use in defining a utili-
ty. It is the possession, in varying degrees, of certain economic
and operational characteristics which has led, first, to government
regulation and, second, to legal determination that certain areas
of public service have the characteristics of a utility and therefore
are properly subject to regulation.
Four qualities are generally recognized as being characteristic of
a utility:
First, to qualify as a utility a particular business must be found
to be affected with a substantial degree of public interest. For ex-
ample, the service and rate structure of an American Telephone
and Telegraph or of a Con Edison have been deemed by the
courts to have substantial public interest aspects combined with a
significant opportunity for abuse by the performer of the service.
Secondly, a utility is characterized by producing a non-inven-
toriable product which must be available in sufficient quantity to
service highly peaked demands. This leads inevitably to substan-
tial amounts of excess capacity during a majority of the time. An
electric utility is expected to generate available capacity to satis-
fy demands in its service area during the early evening hours on
the summer day, essentially without regard to the cost of idle
capacity during the remainder of the year.
Thirdly, largely because of the previous characteristic, utilities
are characterized by heavy capital demands and low capital turn-
over ratios. Some utilities exist which have capital turnover ratios
of only once in every fifteen years although a more average ratio
for the larger utilities appears to be once in every two and a half
years.
CAPITAL TURNOVER RATIO-SELECTED UTILITIES
YEAR END 1974
CAPITALIZATION GROSS REVENUES
COMPANY (000's) (000's) RATIO
A.T.&T. 67,632.9 26,174 .38
Con Ed of N.Y. 5,778,043 2,439.5 .42
Public Service
Electric & Gas 3,808,664 1,455.9 .38
Source: Moody's Winter 1976 Edition
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Finally, and as a result of the preceding three characteristics, util-
ities are characterized by a lack of direct competition from other
producers of the same product within the same geographical area. In
a number of instances this has occurred only after competition has
been tried and found wasteful both from a capital and operating
cost point of view.
No one can contend that the air transport industry exhibits the
foregoing characteristics to the same degree as an electric utility.
Nonetheless, examination of the air transport industry reveals sur-
prisingly similar characteristics.
First, there is considerable evidence that air transportation is
affected with a substantial degree of public interest. Air transpor-
tation carries almost eighty percent of the common carrier inter-
city passenger traffic in the United States today and more than
eighty percent of U.S. mail. More than ninety percent of interna-
tional passenger travel is carried by air transportation. In numer-
ous statements of policy by the U.S. Congress over many years,
transportation in general and air transportation in particular has
been found to be affected with the interest. Even specific portions
of the air transport system have been deemed critical to the public
interest. For example, in the policy statement contained within
Public Law 85-307 it was "declared to be the policy of Congress,
in the interests of the commerce of the United States, the Postal
Service, and the national defense to promote the development of
local, feeder, and short-haul air transportation." The public in-
terest aspect of air transportation has been underlined in many oth-
er procedural practices of the CAB. It has become practice at each
CAB hearing involving the addition or deletion of airline service
for all of the affected cities to appear as protagonists and to play
a significant role in the outcome of the proceeding. To a very im-
portant degree it is because the airlines are so affected with the
public interest that the current desire on the part of some mem-
bers of the Congress to appear to sponsor lower airline fares has
come about. Indeed, lack of adequate air transportation by many
is viewed as seriously as the necessity to reduce power consump-
tion on hot summer days or experience momentary black-outs of
service due to inadequate electric generating capacity.
Secondly, the air transportation industry meets the second utili-
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ty characteristic probably as fully as do most utilities. The air
transportation industry sells a non-inventoriable product; an un-
filled seat once airborne is a wasted product. In fact, unlike many
utilities, the air transportation industry possesses a limited flexi-
bility to adapt the amount of product produced to the specific de-
mand on a given day or at a given hour. Nonetheless, air trans-
portation is expected by the public at large to satisfy a very high
proportion of the peak demand existing (for example, at five
o'clock on the Friday before Christmas) and is therefore subject,
like a utility, to substantial amounts of excess capacity at other
times. The result of this characteristic has been to create an air-
line pricing structure very similar to that of most utility industries.
Incremental cost pricing is practiced widely, with discount fares
being available during nighttime periods and during off-peak trav-
el periods just as utilities have special rates for nighttime and off-
peak usage. Even the load factor characteristics of air transporta-
tion are similar to those of utilities. During the last four years, Con
Edison of New York has achieved an average load factor rang-
ing from 50.5% to 56.4%. During the same four years the domes-
tic trunk airlines achieved load factors ranging from a low of
48.3% to a high of 55.7%.
Thirdly, the airline industry is also capital intensive, and to a
degree which has been largely overlooked by the academicians.
Generally speaking, airlines are able to turn over their balance
sheet capital on the average of 1.25 times per year. This figure
compares to a typical capital turnover in a large utility of about
0.4. On the other hand, the airline capital turnover figure is de-
ceptive. What is generally unrecognized by the academicians is
that scheduled airlines have enormous capital commitments not
shown on their balance sheets. The airlines have committed their
credit throughout the U.S. as the basic security for the construction
of both airports and airport terminal facilities. As mentioned earlier,
the capital required to fulfill all currently existing master plans at
airports served by American Airlines alone totals $4.04 billion.
Airlines serving these airports will be expected to stand security
for these requirements through long-term lease commitments.
American Airlines alone has underwritten airport revenue bond is-
sues in current dollar values to the tune of $736 million-with an
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ongoing commitment to underwrite cost escalation at most of these
same airports as incurred. Viewed in these terms, capital turnover
ratios of the airline industry are no better than the average utility.
The public and the academicians have been misled in this regard
by the fact that these basic lease commitments have not yet ap-
peared on airline balance sheets and have thus been ignored.
Finally, the fourth characteristic of utility industries is a lack of
direct competition. In almost all other countries in the world the
preceding three characteristics have been deemed adequate to
cause air transportation to be regulated as a total monopoly. In
such countries there is one flag carrier owned in part or totally by
the government and given the monopoly rights to provide internal
and external air service. In the United States a different practice
has been followed. Perhaps because of the substantial geographic
area it has been found practical to certificate limited competition
on major routes within the country and a more limited degree of
competition between U.S. carriers on international routes. Various
carriers may challenge the degree of competition to which they are
subject, but none would challenge the concept that some competi-
tion on some routes is beneficial to the efficiency of the industry.
Controversy arises only when unlimited or excessive competition
is contemplated. Contrary to most public utilities, air service is spa-
tially fluid and a given airplane can be transferred from serving
one pair of points to serving another. Nonetheless, that ability to
transfer is limited by public interest considerations and by commit-
ments made to underwrite airport and airport facility develop-
ment.
Nor is the view completely correct that, unlike a true utility,
airline assets are relatively liquid. Up to a point, aircraft may be
sold to other airlines, but this possibility is more limited than gen-
erally recognized. Cockpit configurations differ widely between car-
riers and pilot training requirements force total cockpit standardi-
zation of any carrier's fleet. Investments of one million dollars or
more may be required to achieve such standardization on a newly
acquired used aircraft. Finally, airport revenue bond commitments
are not transferable and must be primarily shared among sched-
uled certificated carriers. American Airlines, in common with oth-
er major carriers, has many other investments which are not readi-
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ly liquifiable. These include large hangar facilities constructed to
facilitate aircraft maintenance, main overhaul bases, flight training
facilities with highly sophisticated simulators, etc. In American
Airlines' case alone the non-capitalized lease commitments for the
period 1975 to 2010 total over $1.2 billion. Even these figures do
not tell the full story since American's landing fee payments of
roughly $40 million per year constitute a further, ongoing commit-
ment of the corporation to airport construction and operating
costs. When all investment elements are cumulated, American's
capital turnover ratio drops to approximately 0.5, a number not
atypical of many utilities.
V. SUMMARY
This paper has addressed the probable effects of partial or total
deregulation of the U.S. air transportation industry. It has attempt-
ed to show that the existing air transportation structure is serving
the public convenience and necessity requirements for air transpor-
tation in a manner superior to any other country's air transport
system. Finally, it has attempted to show that deregulation would
be counter-productive in that its long term effect would probably
result in higher, rather than lower, prices and would also probably
destroy a substantial portion of existing service to smaller U.S.
cities. Many transport economists have discussed these points. For
example, D. Philip Locklin in his book Economics of Transporta-
tion summarized his discussion of regulation as follows:
[lit by no means follows that unrestricted competition would pro-
duce desirable results. If overcapacity developed, as would be
quite likely, the temptation to out-of-pocket-cost rate making
would appear; and even if it did not, earnings would likely be de-
pressed below a remunerative level. Competition would soon give
way to some form of monopolistic control.
Another factor which should be considered is the possible effect
of unrestricted freedom of entry on safety standards. The high de-
gree of hazard in the air-transport industry makes it imperative
that competitive pressures and the resulting struggle for survival
do not lead to inadequate safety measures. This is a matter which
cannot be controlled entirely through strict safety regulations im-
posed by public authority.
One other probable result of unrestricted entry should be rec-
ognized before a decision is made to abandon present regulatory
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controls. It would substantially change the airline pattern in the
United States. More competitive services would doubtless be avail-
able between important traffic centers; but air service at smaller
cities, and on some routes, would disappear. The carrier would be
under no obligation to provide service to cities that enplaned or
deplaned little traffic. In fact, if traffic between the major cities
was spread too thin among competing carriers, the airlines could
not afford to provide service at the smaller communities.
Most other transportation economists with the benefit of experi-
ence within or extended study of the air transport industry have
reached similar conclusions.
Any proposal to deregulate or substantially alter the current
structure of regulation is therefore strongly opposed by the airlines
of the United States. This is not to say that modifications to the
current regulatory system should not be made and would not prove
beneficial both to the traveling public and to the airline industry it-
self. The Air Transport Association, representing most of the
United States scheduled airline industry, has proposed the follow-
ing regulatory modifications:
-Regulatory lag at the Civil Aeronautics Board should be re-
duced by specifying firm and reasonably short time limits within
which petitions and applications must be either heard or dismiss-
ed.
-Additionally, a way should be found to permit airline man-
agement latitude to make reasonable pricing adjustments without
governmental intervention. Such flexibility is necessary to cope
with suddenly changing cost pressures and it may be well to try it
for a test period. Such a concept is popularly known as a zone of
reasonableness; but the way this point has been addressed in the
proposed Aviation Act of 1975 falls too wide of the mark.
-The President's power to over-rule the CAB in regulatory
decisions on international routes and rates should be limited to
foreign policy and national defense considerations.
The foregoing regulatory modifications, contrary to the pro-
posals contained in the Aviation Act of 1975, will strengthen, not
weaken, the efficient, high-performance air transport system we al-
ready have.
One final point should be noted with regard to the controversy
over deregulation. The issue thus far has been solely whether fed-
eral regulation of air transportation should be discontinued or
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drastically modified. Overlooked is the probable effect of such an
action on state and local regulatory activity. The states of Califor-
nia, Texas, and Alaska already have intrastate carriers which they
regulate with regard to routes, rates, and other economic para-
meters. Most other states also exert some degree of regulatory con-
trol over airlines serving their territory. It is inevitable, if the fed-
eral government relinquishes its preemptive position in the regu-
lation of interstate airline commerce, that states and local govern-
ments will quickly fill the vacuum. The chaos which would result
from fifty separate state, or one thousand local, regulatory bodies
legislating rules and regulations regarding interstate airline opera-
tions is difficult to comprehend.

